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Head Above the Parapet: How Lone Dissenting Subordinates Influence Group Outcomes and the 
Consequences They Face for Doing So 
Powerholders — those with control over valued resources — have often been portrayed as 
immune to the influence of others, and especially immune to the influence of those who depend 
on them in order to access those resources (i.e., subordinates) (Handgraaf, van Dijk, & De 
Cremer, 2003; Nemeth, 2009; Oc & Bashshur, 2013; Oc, Bashshur, & Moore, 2015). Though, 
without doubt, subordinates can and sometimes do resist the decisions of those who hold power 
over them (Furst & Cable, 2008; Mumby, Thomas, Martí, & Seidl, 2017; Tepper, Duffy & Shaw, 
2001; Yukl, Fu, & McDonald, 2003), dominant portrayals of the powerholder/subordinate 
relationship as well as theorizing about this relationship tend to take the view that influence flows 
downwards from powerholders to subordinates (Keltner, van Kleef, Chen, & Kraus, 2008; 
Nemeth, 2009; Shamir, 2007). This perspective is not unreasonable, given consistent findings 
that individuals with power tend to pursue their own self-interest at the expense of others, retain 
larger proportions of scarce resources for themselves (Oc et al., 2015; Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, 
& Keltner, 2010; van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006), and feel entitled and legitimate as they do so 
(Blader & Chen, 2012; De Cremer & van Dijk, 2005; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003).  
However, it is a mistake to assume that subordinates accept powerholders’ decisions 
without questioning or reacting to them. Indeed, research on social movements provides 
compelling empirical evidence that when individuals feel deprived, or that their rights have been 
violated, they are motivated to voice their objections to those who hold power over them, even to 
the point of engaging in collective actions such as social protest (Dube & Guimond, 1986; Smith 
& Ortiz, 2002; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). 
Other recent work positions subordinates as an important source of social information for 
powerholders and shows that subordinate reactions to powerholders’ decisions can weaken 
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powerholders’ self-interested tendencies over time (Dana, Cain, & Dawes, 2006; Handgraaf, van 
Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke, & De Dreu, 2008; Oc et al., 2015; Scott, Colquitt, & Paddock, 2009).  
Although this body of work helps us better understand how influence can flow upward 
from subordinates to powerholders, most studies on subordinate influence to date have treated 
them as an undifferentiated mass. Subordinates’ influence is typically operationalized in terms of 
their aggregated reactions (e.g., Oc et al., 2015; Scott et al., 2009), or simply as a function of their 
presence or absence (e.g., Dana et al., 2006; Handgraaf et al., 2008). It is perhaps unsurprising 
that someone in a position of power would respond to the influence efforts of a unanimous chorus 
of voices. Yet, how often do these occur? We well know that there are strong pressures to 
conform to the preferences of those in positions of authority (Milgram, 1974), and the perceived 
consensus of groups (Asch, 1951), even when doing so leads to negative outcomes (Janis, 1983). 
And work on employee voice and silence provides compelling evidence that it is extremely 
difficult to tell individuals in positions of power that they are behaving in a self-interested 
fashion, making silence the dominant organizational response to abuses of power and 
mistreatment (Bashshur & Oc, 2015; Morrison, 2014).  
Where does this leave us? Popular sentiment often alludes to the power of the individual in 
creating positive social change. But we actually know very little about whether one person can 
actually change the behavior of those with power. Empirical research has largely neglected the 
potentially critical possibility that subordinates who express a lone dissenting opinion within a 
group shape their own and others’ outcomes. We ask the question: can one person make a 
difference in changing the behavior of those with power over them?  
Drawing on existing work on power (Dana et al., 2006; De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005; Oc 
et al., 2015; Samuelson & Allison, 1994), as well as research on social influence (Latané, 1981, 
HEAD ABOVE THE PARAPET        
  
3 
1996; Latané & Wolf, 1981), minority1 influence (Moscovici & Lage, 1976; Nemeth, 1986, 
2009), and devil’s advocacy (Schwenk, 1990), we examine how a lone dissenting subordinate can 
influence the patterns and trends of powerholders’ allocation behavior over time. We focus on an 
ongoing resource allocation process between powerholders and their subordinates and argue that 
a subordinate who provides powerholders with feedback, even as a lone dissenting voice, will 
have an effect on powerholders’ allocation behavior in the direction of their feedback. 
Specifically, we predict that a lone dissenting subordinate who provides powerholders with 
negative feedback (whom we label a “candid” subordinate) causes powerholders to restrain their 
self-interested tendencies. Conversely, we predict that a lone dissenting subordinate who provides 
powerholders with positive feedback (whom we label a “compliant” subordinate) makes it easier 
for the powerholder to make more self-interested allocations over time. 
We extend these arguments by exploring group identification as a moderator of the 
influence of these lone dissenting subordinates (Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Schneider, 1990; De 
Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; Messick & Brewer, 1983; Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999). Given the 
substantial evidence that an individual’s influence is amplified when he or she shares an 
important social identity with their influence target (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & 
Turner, 1990; Postmes, Spears, Sakhel, & de Groot, 2001), we predict that a lone dissenting 
subordinate will have a stronger effect on a powerholder’s allocations when he or she shares a 
salient group membership with the powerholder.  
Lastly, we explore the consequences that subordinates face when they act alone in 
expressing a dissenting opinion. Specifically, we explore whether powerholders reward lone 
compliant subordinates in groups of otherwise candid subordinates, and whether they penalize 
lone candid subordinates in groups of otherwise compliant subordinates. Finally, we examine 
                                                     
1 Though the term minority is often used to refer to individuals as a function of their demographic characteristics 
such as race or sex, this paper uses the term minority to refer to individuals who express opinions unexpressed by 
the majority of the group’s other members, in the tradition of research on minority influence (Nemeth 1986, 2009).   
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whether group identification affects the extent to which these lone dissenting subordinates are 
rewarded or punished.   
The Role of Subordinate Feedback in Powerholders’ Allocation Decisions 
Unfortunately, those with power over valued resources tend to tip the scales in their own 
favor, especially in the absence of incentives to consider others’ interests, and feel legitimate in 
violating equity or equality norms (Dawes, 1980; Kabanoff, 1991). For example, simply being 
appointed to a powerful position appears to license individuals to exploit their power and violate 
equal division rules in resource allocations (e.g., De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005; Samuelson & 
Allison, 1994). Nevertheless, like any other individual, powerholders are strongly motivated to 
maintain a positive self-image, both for themselves (privately), and in terms of how they are seen 
by others (publicly).  
It is important for individuals to see themselves as ethical, likeable, and, in general, not 
self-interested (Allison, Messick, & Goethals, 1989; Blasi, 1984; Lerner, 1980; Messick, Bloom, 
Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985), as well as to believe that others also see them that way (Dana, 
Weber, & Kuang, 2007; Franzen & Pointner, 2012). As Barclay, Bashshur, and Fortin (2017) 
point out, seeing oneself (and being seen) as a fair person “is a desired social identity and 
managers are motivated to engage in behaviors that will establish and maintain this identity” (p. 
877). Indeed, studies show that powerholders prefer to remain ignorant of the effects of their self-
interested decisions on others (Dana et al., 2007), ostensibly because these negative effects are 
difficult to reconcile with a positive private self-image. Powerholders are also willing to sacrifice 
some of their potential earnings in order hide the fact that they are being selfish from their 
subordinates (Dana et al., 2006), presumably because they are motivated to maintain a public 
self-image as a fair person.  
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Powerholders thus care about how subordinates respond to their choices, and, as a result, 
subordinate reactions have implications for powerholders’ subsequent choices. For example, in a 
series of experiments using a multi-round allocation paradigm, when subordinates expressed 
feedback that accurately reflected the self-interested nature of a powerholder’s allocations—in 
other words, when they received more negative feedback after making more self-interested 
allocations—powerholders responded with less self-interested allocations in subsequent rounds 
(Oc et al., 2015). Furthermore, the feedback that they were being perceived as unfair caused 
powerholders to feel more guilt, which led to more generous subsequent allocations. This 
connection between negative feedback, guilt and changes in powerholders’ behavior makes 
sense, given that guilt is a self-conscious emotion (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007) that is 
triggered when one’s self-image has been tarnished, and motivates reparative action “to alleviate 
the guilt [and] gild the image” (Carlsmith & Gross, 1969, p. 236). 
Together, these findings suggest that while powerholders act in self-interested ways, they 
are still constrained by the desire to maintain a public and private self-image as a fair person and 
will, “change their behaviors to be seen as fair and to maintain their self-image” (Barclay et al, 
2017, p. 878). However, to date, these effects have only been studies in contexts where a group of 
subordinates expresses a unanimous opinion to someone who holds power over them, and is thus 
difficult to ignore (Oc et al., 2015). The question of whether a lone dissenting subordinate can 
exert influence over powerholders’ allocation decisions remains open. In this paper, we address 
this open question.  
The Influence of Lone Dissenting Subordinates on Powerholders’ Allocations 
Why should we care about the role of a lone dissenter? Research documents that numeric 
minorities in groups can disproportionately affect outcomes, as long as their behavior is 
consistent and they remain committed to their views (Moscovici & Nemeth, 1974). However, 
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most studies in this area have focused on how a minority group member can shape other group 
members’ behaviors and attitudes in groups of relative equals, often leading to better group 
outcomes. For example, earlier research on decision making showed that individuals who take the 
role of a devil’s advocate helps groups arrive at higher quality decisions; this is because devil’s 
advocates introduce dissent into the decision-making process, challenge others’ assumptions, and 
ensure other alternatives are considered (Schwenk, 1990). In a similar vein, Weber and 
Murnighan (2008) showed how one individual who consistently contributes to the common good 
(despite risking personal financial loss) increases the average payout for all group members. And, 
of course, as the Asch (1951) studies on group conformity demonstrated, the presence of a lone 
group member who states opinions counter to the majority can seriously increase the likelihood 
that other group members will also contravene group norms. 
How a lone dissenting group member shapes the behavior of those in positions of power is 
less well understood. Our first two hypotheses build on prior findings about minority influence to 
claim that a lone dissenter will have an effect on powerholders, even from a subordinate position. 
They draw from research on social influence, which suggests that even as a lone dissenting voice, 
a single subordinate will influence other members of their group (e.g., Latané & Wolf, 1981; 
Moscovici & Lage, 1976; Nemeth, 1986). While one might argue that a lone voice in a chorus of 
otherwise undifferentiated positive (or negative) voices could be easily ignored (Seifert, Yukl, & 
McDonald, 2003), such a voice would be conspicuous, and likely attended to, precisely because it 
is unique (Latané & Wolf, 1981). As Latané and Wolf state, “by standing out against the crowd, 
the minority gains visibility and becomes the focus of attention in the group” (1981, p. 440).  
Lone subordinate positive feedback licenses more self-interested allocations. 
Certainly, if a powerholder hears nothing but positive feedback about how they are treating their 
subordinates, their actions are unlikely to change. Indeed, when powerholders hear unanimously 
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positive feedback from their subordinates about how they are allocating resources, they become 
increasingly more self-interested over time (Oc et al., 2015). But would a lone voice expressing 
compliant, positive feedback be enough to license powerholders to grant themselves increasingly 
self-interested allocations, even when the rest of their subordinates are providing candid feedback 
about how self-interested they are being?   
We argue that even a lone positive voice may be enough to grant the powerholder 
permission to continue behaving more self-interestedly, even when the rest of their subordinates 
unanimously disagree with that positive assessment. A lone positive voice will receive attention 
not only because of its uniqueness and visibility within a group (Latané & Wolf, 1981), but also 
because individuals tend to interpret information in ways that benefit them (Pyszczynski, 
Greenberg, & LaPrelle, 1985; Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Lüthgens, & Moscovici, 2000). A lone 
compliant voice will help powerholders continue to pursue their self-interest, as it confirms what 
powerholders prefer to hear even when others (in this case, other subordinates) provide them with 
candid feedback that is potentially threatening to their self-image (Nickerson, 1998). We argue 
that the positive, compliant feedback of the lone subordinate can alleviate (although not 
completely eliminate) the threat to their positive self-image that negative feedback from others in 
the group elicits. Thus, we propose that the presence of a lone subordinate expressing compliant, 
positive feedback about a powerholder’s allocations in a group of subordinates expressing more 
negative feedback about those allocations will be enough to provide powerholders with the 
license they need to increase how self-interested their allocations are, leading them to keep more 
for themselves over time. Hence, we hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis 1: If a lone subordinate provides compliant feedback about a powerholder’s 
allocation decisions (in a group where other subordinates are providing candid feedback 
HEAD ABOVE THE PARAPET        
  
8 
about how self-interested those allocations are), powerholders will show a significant 
upward trend in self-allocations over time.  
Lone subordinate negative feedback curbs self-interested allocations. On the other 
hand, in a group of subordinates providing positive feedback to powerholders, a lone dissenting 
subordinate who provides feedback that accurately reflects how self-interested the powerholder’s 
allocations are will also likely have an effect on powerholders’ behavior. Again, this will be due 
to the uniqueness and visibility within a group of this dissenting voice (Latané & Wolf, 1981), 
although in this case in a different manner and for a different reason. As Smither, London, and 
Richmond (2005) showed, when an individual receives negative feedback from some sources but 
positive feedback from others, they are more mindful of the negative feedback and strive to make 
sense of it. In addition, the fact that candid, negative feedback of a lone subordinate has the 
potential to threaten powerholders positive self-image (Barclay et al., 2017; Epley & Dunning, 
2000; Kaplan, 1993; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992) means that his or her feedback should still 
influence the powerholder to become less self-interested (Oc & Bashshur, 2013). Hence, we 
argue that the presence of even one candid subordinate in a group of otherwise compliant 
subordinates will increase powerholders’ responsiveness to the candid subordinate’s feedback, 
which we predict will be enough to cause powerholders to regulate their self-interested 
tendencies over time.  
Hypothesis 2: If a lone subordinate provides candid feedback about how self-interested a 
powerholder’s allocation decisions are (in a group where other subordinates provide 
consistently positive feedback about those allocations), powerholders will regulate their 
allocation behavior. That is, powerholders will keep less (more) of the resource for 
themselves after receiving more negative (positive) feedback from a lone candid 
subordinate. 
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These two hypotheses reflect the primary focus of this paper: that powerholders’ 
allocation decisions will be influenced by the feedback of a lone dissenting subordinate, in the 
direction of their feedback. We next examine whether powerholders’ responses to this feedback 
differs depending on whether or not they share a salient group membership with the dissenter.  
The Moderating Role of Group Identification  
Subordinates differ in more ways than just the type of feedback they provide to 
powerholders. They also differ in their relevant knowledge or experience, as well as their values, 
beliefs, and attitudes. These differences likely affect how influential their feedback is likely to be. 
Social impact theory (Latané, 1981) argues that subordinates’ influence over powerholders will 
increase as their status or social similarity with the powerholder increases. Group identification as 
a function of shared group membership is a primary trigger of similarity attributions. Thus, the 
extent to which powerholders identify with others in their group is likely especially important.   
Research on social dilemmas provides compelling evidence that when individuals share 
membership in salient social groups, they are motivated to pursue collective gains rather than 
individual self-interest (Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Schneider, 1990; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 
1999; Messick & Brewer, 1983; Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999). In a series of studies, De Cremer 
and colleagues (De Cremer, Van Knippenberg, Van Dijk, & van Leeuwen, 2008; De Cremer & 
Van Vugt, 1999) offer two theoretical explanations for why shared group membership inspires 
individuals to behave more generously to each other. First, they point out that one reason 
individuals limit their cooperation with others in social dilemmas is because they fear their 
contributions will not be reciprocated (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; Yamagishi, 1986). They argue, 
however, that group identification may moderate this tendency because high group identification 
increases trust in others and supports the belief that they will cooperate (Brann & Foddy, 1987; 
Brewer, 1981; Kramer, Brewer & Hanna, 1996; Kramer & Goldman, 1995).  
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Second, and more relevant to our research, they argue that when individuals strongly 
identify with others in their group, they perceive those group members as having similar goals 
and achievements to their own and become more likely to cooperate with them (Tajfel & Turner, 
1986; Turner, 1982; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). De Cremer and Van Vugt 
(1999) demonstrated across three experimental studies that individuals contributed more to the 
collective when their group identification was high. These studies show, as Brewer and Kramer 
reason, that “inclusion within a common social boundary acts to reduce psychological distance 
among group members, making it less likely that they will make sharp distinctions between their 
own and others' welfare” (1986, p. 545).  
Considering that group identification can influence the allocation of resources, the 
question then becomes how the identity of a subordinate, and in particular those expressing a lone 
dissenting voice, influences powerholders’ allocations. Existing empirical research on intergroup 
relations has shown repeatedly that individuals’ feeling of group identification can increase 
simply when they know they and others share group membership (Abrams et al., 1990; Kramer & 
Brewer, 1984; Turner et al., 1987). Importantly, this type of identification does not require formal 
group membership, but can be based on membership in many types of groups, including political 
parties, colleges, or sport teams (Cohen, 2003; Murrell & Dietz, 1992; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 
2007). Group identification can even be triggered using minimal group paradigms, which can 
elicit identification as a function of one’s preferences or physical features (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, 
& Flament, 1971).  
We argue that when a powerholder shares an identity or salient group membership with a 
subordinate, the feedback from that subordinate will exert greater influence over that 
powerholder’s allocation decisions. Hence, we expect that feedback from a lone dissenting 
subordinate, whether candid or compliant, will be more influential when it comes from a 
subordinate who shares a salient group membership. Therefore, we hypothesize:  
HEAD ABOVE THE PARAPET        
  
11 
Hypothesis 3: The extent to which a powerholder shares a salient group membership with 
the lone dissenting subordinate will moderate the influence of that subordinate, such that: 
(a) the upward trend in self-allocations over time will be stronger when a lone compliant 
subordinate and the powerholder share a salient group membership, and (b) powerholders 
will regulate their allocation behavior more strongly when a lone candid subordinate and 
the powerholder share a salient group membership. 
Consequences for Lone Dissenting Subordinates 
 So far, our hypotheses have focused on the effect of feedback from lone dissenting 
subordinates on powerholders’ allocations (Hypotheses 1 and 2) and the amplification of that 
effect as a function of powerholders’ shared group membership with the subordinate (Hypothesis 
3). In essence, these hypotheses posit that having one compliant subordinate in a group of candid 
subordinates will help the powerholder pursue his or her own self-interest at the expense of 
subordinates, while having one candid subordinate in a group of compliant subordinates will 
make it more difficult for the powerholder to act self-interestedly, helping subordinates receive 
more favorable outcomes. We further hypothesize that these outcomes will be amplified when the 
powerholder and the lone dissenting subordinate share a salient group membership.  
Given these expected effects on everyone else’s outcomes, another relevant question 
(with practically important implications) is whether lone dissenting subordinates are uniquely 
penalized or rewarded for putting their “head above the parapet”. Given the opportunity, will 
powerholders specifically reward a lone compliant subordinate in a group of candid subordinates 
for their positive feedback, and be even more generous when they share the same group 
membership? In contrast, will powerholders punish a lone candid subordinate in a group of 
compliant subordinates for their challenging negative feedback, but less so when they share a 
salient group identity?  
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Recent work on upward feedback provides some insight into how this treatment may 
unfold. Refraining from negative feedback can make subordinates appear less disrespectful to 
higher-ups (Atwater & Waldman, 2008), increase powerholders’ liking of the subordinate 
(Baron, 1996), and engender positive attitudes towards them (Atwater, Waldman, Atwater, & 
Cartier, 2000). Given powerholders’ limited resources and the need to be selective when 
distributing them, powerholders may favor subordinates whom they regard as more respectful 
and whom they like more. Hence, we predict that powerholders will reward lone subordinates 
who provide consistently positive feedback with preferential allocations, especially when they are 
in groups of subordinates who do not provide similarly positive feedback.  
Hypothesis 4: A lone subordinate who provides compliant feedback in a group of candid 
subordinates will be awarded more of the common resource than the candid subordinates of 
their group.  
In contrast, it is less clear what to hypothesize about the outcomes for lone candid 
subordinates. On one hand, the literature on whistleblowing and employee voice suggests that 
voicing a lone negative view to those in power is fraught with risk. For instance, in one study of 
161 whistle-blowers, only 5% reported experiencing no retaliation for their actions (Jos, 
Tompkins, & Hays, 1989). Similarly, employee voice—proactively bringing up concerns to 
management—can be detrimental to the individual, particularly if it is perceived as challenging, as 
it can make a subordinate look disloyal or threatening (Burris, 2012). As such, negative feedback 
may cause powerholders to hold negative attitudes towards the lone dissenting subordinate who 
provided it (Burris, Detert, & Romney, 2013; Seibert, Kramer, & Crant, 2001), and ultimately 
cause powerholders to penalize them. 
On the other hand, research on upward feedback suggests that providing negative feedback 
to powerholders may not be as risky as is often thought. Although, in general, individuals may 
dislike when others disagree with them (Phillips & Loyd, 2006), there is some evidence that 
HEAD ABOVE THE PARAPET        
  
13 
powerholders react more positively to negative feedback than those with less power (Baron, 
1996). They also sometimes act on negative feedback, going so far as to seek additional feedback 
in an effort to identify changes they need to enact (Ashford & Cummings, 1983; Taylor, Fisher, & 
Ilgen, 1984; Waldman & Atwater, 2001). Hence, powerholders may be able to withstand negative 
feedback from candid minorities, see value in it, and refrain from punishing them. Since the 
literature does not provide a clear direction for this hypothesis, we propose two exploratory, 
competing hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 5, Option A: A lone candid subordinate in a group of subordinates providing 
compliant feedback will be awarded less of the common resource than others in their group. 
Hypothesis 5, Option B: A lone candid subordinate in a group of subordinates providing 
compliant feedback will not be awarded less of the common resource than others in their 
group. 
We also expect that the type of feedback lone dissenting subordinates provide to 
powerholders will interact with the powerholder’s group identification to shape how they are 
rewarded or punished. Research on minority influence in decision-making contexts makes clear 
that the identity of the influencer affects targets’ feelings, behaviors or reactions to them (Phillips 
& Loyd, 2006), because individuals care about the social approval they receive from others, 
especially from similar others or those with whom they share group membership (Turner, 1985). 
Individuals are aware that they risk social disapproval when they act in ways that are not accepted 
by similar others (Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, & Blackstone, 1994) and will conform to 
their expectations in an effort to avoid this.  
For this reason, we believe powerholders’ reactions to lone dissenting subordinates who 
provide them with either compliant or candid feedback will depend on whether that subordinate 
and powerholder share a salient group membership. Specifically, we expect lone subordinates who 
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express compliant feedback (in groups of candid subordinates) to be awarded even more than their 
peers when they share a salient group membership with the powerholder (as opposed to when they 
are from a different group), because their positive feedback will communicate social approval and 
acceptance from a similar other. Conversely, when a lone candid subordinate and the powerholder 
do not share a salient group membership, we expect powerholders to penalize them (or award 
them less than compliant minorities from the same group), given powerholders will not see the 
candid subordinate as a similar other and be more likely to punish them for their dissenting 
negative voice. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis 6a: The amount that a powerholder will award to a lone subordinate who 
provides compliant feedback in a group of candid subordinates will be moderated by 
whether the powerholder and the subordinate share a salient group membership, such that a 
lone compliant subordinate will be specifically rewarded if they share (vs. do not share) a 
salient group membership with the powerholder.  
Hypothesis 6b: The amount that a powerholder will award to a lone subordinate who 
provides candid feedback in a group of compliant subordinates will be moderated by 
whether the powerholder and the subordinate share a salient group membership such that a 
lone candid subordinate will be specifically penalized if they do not share (vs. share) a 
salient group membership with the powerholder.  
Overview of Studies 
 We examine whether subordinates who express a lone dissenting voice in a group can 
influence powerholders’ allocation decisions over time. Specifically, in Study 1, we provide 
initial evidence that a lone dissenting subordinate who provides consistently positive feedback to 
powerholders about their allocation decisions (“compliant” subordinates) facilitates 
powerholders’ increasingly self-interested allocations over time (Hypothesis 1), while a lone 
dissenting subordinate who provides candid feedback to powerholders about their allocation 
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decisions increases the extent to which powerholders regulate their allocation behavior and resist 
making increasingly self-interested allocations over time (Hypothesis 2). In Study 2, we explore 
whether sharing a group identity with the powerholder moderates the influence of lone dissenting 
subordinates (Hypothesis 3). In Study 3, we replicate our results for Hypothesis 3 using a 
different group identity and explore how powerholders punish or reward lone dissenting 
subordinates as a function of their feedback and the degree to which they share a group identity 
with the subordinate (Hypotheses 4-6).  
Study 1 
Sample  
We recruited seventy-seven participants from a paid, community-based subject pool in 
London, U.K. Participants were paid £10 for their participation, with the possibility of earning up 
to another £10 depending on the decisions they made in the study. Sixty-three percent of the 
sample was female with an average age of 26.97 years (SD = 11.72, Min = 18, Max = 59). 
Experimental Setting and Procedure 
 In order to establish a causal relationship between a lone subordinate’s feedback and 
changes in powerholders’ subsequent allocations, and to eliminate possible alternative 
explanations, we used a multi-party, multi-round dictator game (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & 
Sefton, 1994). We used the experimental procedure introduced by Oc et al. (2015), with one key 
difference. In this study, instead of receiving feedback from a group of subordinates who all 
provided the same feedback (all “compliant” or all “candid”), powerholders received feedback 
from both candid and compliant subordinates within the same group. Specifically, groups varied 
in terms of whether they contained two compliant and one candid subordinate or two candid and 
one compliant subordinate. We explored powerholders reactions to feedback from each of their 
subordinates and whether the feedback of lone dissenting subordinates shaped the way 
powerholders allocated resources over time.  
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As in Oc et al. (2015), upon arrival to the laboratory, participants were seated at computer 
cubicles, each containing a personal computer. Participants’ identities were anonymous. We 
informed them that they would take the role of a powerholder (i.e., dictator) or a subordinate 
(i.e., recipient). However, all participants were actually assigned the role of the powerholder and 
a computer program (z-Tree; Fischbacher, 2007) simulated subordinate feedback. During each 
round, the group was given an initial resource of 100 experimental points to be distributed by the 
powerholder to his or her three subordinates. Powerholders kept the amount of points they chose 
for themselves and the remainder of the points were equally distributed by the computer program 
to the subordinates. We informed participants that their bonus earnings (up to an additional £10) 
would depend on the amount of experimental points they kept over the course of the study: the 
more points they kept, the higher their earnings would be. During the debriefing, we checked 
whether participants understood the dynamics of the game and probed them for suspicion that the 
subordinates were fake. Four participants failed to correctly answer questions designed to check 
whether they understood the game or reported suspicion that the subordinates were fake. Three 
participants also failed at least one of three embedded attention check items. Together these 
seven participants were excluded from the analyses, leaving us with seventy participants in the 
final sample.  
Conditions. In their study, Oc et al. (2015) showed that feedback from groups of all 
candid subordinates made powerholders regulate their allocation behavior, and feedback from 
groups of all compliant subordinates made them make increasingly more self-interested 
allocations over time. Our interest here was to test whether a lone dissenting subordinate could 
shift powerholders’ allocation decisions in the direction of their feedback. Hence, we examined 
two lone dissenting subordinate conditions. In the “lone candid subordinate” condition, 
powerholders were in a group with two compliant subordinates (who reacted in a consistently 
positive manner) and one candid subordinate (who reacted more or less positively based on how 
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self-interested the powerholders’ allocation had been in the previous round). In the “lone 
compliant subordinate” condition this situation was reversed and powerholders were in a group 
with two candid subordinates and one compliant subordinate.  
Our groups were comprised of one powerholder and three subordinates for three reasons. 
First, as Asch (1951) showed, the effect of adding additional group members beyond three 
generates relatively less influence for each member added. Second, given that any one individual 
exerts less influence as groups grow larger (Latané & Wolf, 1981), we reasoned that using 
groups comprised of one lone dissenting subordinate with two others offered the clearest first 
step to determine whether the lone dissenter would influence their powerholder. Third, in order 
to contrast our findings with theirs, we kept the same number of subordinates in each group as 
Oc et al. (2015) did. 
Measures and Operationalization 
Classification of powerholders’ allocation behavior. In order to manipulate 
subordinate feedback in the two conditions, we first had to classify powerholders’ allocation 
behavior (as in Oc et al., 2015). In line with previous research (e.g., de Kwaadsteniet, Rijkhoff, 
& van Dijk, 2013), we used an equal division rule as the reference to define powerholders’ 
allocations as more or less self-interested. In the first round of the study, when powerholders 
kept more than an equal share of the common resource (more than 25%), their allocation was 
defined as negative. In contrast, when they kept an equal or less than an equal share, their 
allocation was defined as positive. After the first round, we used the change in the powerholder’s 
allocation from the previous round in addition to the absolute level of their allocation to classify 
their allocation behavior. Specifically, when powerholders kept more than an equal share and 
took more or an equal amount of resources compared to the previous round, their allocation was 
defined as “very negative” (--); and when they kept more than an equal share but took fewer 
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resources compared to the previous round, their allocation was defined as “negative” (-). In 
contrast, when powerholders kept an equal share or less than an equal share but took more 
resources compared to the previous round, their allocation was defined as “positive” (+); and 
when they kept an equal share or less than an equal share and took fewer resources compared to 
previous round their allocation was defined as “very positive” (++).  
Subordinate feedback. Subordinate feedback was computationally modeled and 
reported back to powerholders as individual evaluations (rather than in an aggregate, as in Oc et 
al., 2015). Specifically, powerholders received computer-generated evaluations from their 
subordinates on a scale from 1 (very unfair) to 5 (very fair) depending on their allocation 
decisions in the previous round. To increase the realism of the feedback, candid subordinates 
provided powerholders with evaluations below 3 when their previous allocations were either 
“very negative” or “negative” and above 3 when their previous allocations were either “positive” 
or “very positive”. Conversely, compliant subordinates provided powerholders with evaluations 
between 3 and 5 irrespective of how the powerholders’ previous allocations were classified. We 
further manipulated the feedback powerholders received from each of the subordinates in their 
group by varying the composition of the group (so that the type of feedback varied within the 
group of subordinates). As an example, a powerholder in the lone compliant subordinate 
condition behaving negatively (that is, allocating a less than an equal share to subordinates but 
allocating more than they had in the previous round) would receive two ratings varying between 
a score of “2” and “3” from two candid (majority) subordinates and one rating varying between 
“3” and “5” from the (lone) compliant subordinate, as a function of the algorithm used by the 
program. In addition to the individual ratings powerholders received, they also saw the average 
of the three ratings as well as the standard deviation of those ratings. 
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Results 
Analytic strategy. We are interested in (1) the changes powerholders make in their 
allocations from one round to another (i.e., whether the allocation in a given round is significantly 
different than the prior round, as a function of subordinate feedback), as well as (2) whether the 
trend of their allocation behavior over time is increasingly self-interested (i.e., if the slope of self-
allocations across rounds for the powerholder significantly different from zero) and as such it is 
not appropriate to analyze the data from this experiment using typical analytic approaches (such as 
analysis of variance). Traditional experimental analytic strategies do not provide appropriate tests 
for these questions. Instead, we employ a random effects panel data approach (e.g., Liang, Farh, & 
Farh, 2012; Oc et al., 2015). This approach allows us to exploit the statistical power resulting from 
these panel data, and provides a way to test both of these primary interests while accounting for 
the fact that the data include multiple observations nested within individuals and are therefore 
non-independent. All the analyses were performed in STATA 13.0 (StataCorp, 2005) and using 
the xtreg.re command for random-effects models. 
Hypothesis tests. Recall that Hypotheses 1 and 2 propose that a lone subordinate will affect 
powerholders’ allocation behavior in the direction of their feedback such that a lone compliant 
subordinate (in a group of otherwise candid subordinates) will make powerholders become 
increasingly self-interested over time (Hypothesis 1) while a lone candid subordinate (in a group 
of otherwise compliant subordinates) will make powerholders regulate their allocation behavior 
over time (Hypothesis 2). Table 1 (Study 1) presents the results of a random-effects model that 
tests whether there was a significant trend in powerholders’ self-allocations across rounds, testing 
Hypothesis 1. Powerholders in groups of two candid subordinates and one compliant subordinate 
kept increasingly more resources over time (β = .10, p < .001, see Table 1 [Study 1] and Figure 1). 
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That is, the slope of the line representing their allocations across rounds was significantly different 
from zero and positive. The presence of a lone subordinate providing compliant (consistently 
positive) feedback to a powerholder was enough to make the powerholder make increasingly more 
self-interested allocations over time. This effect is similar to that found by Oc et al. (2015), except 
in that case the significant trend was found in groups of all compliant subordinates, where here 
just one compliant subordinate in a group of otherwise candid subordinates was enough to trigger 
a significant, increasing trend in the powerholder’s self-interested allocations over time.   
--------------- Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 about here --------------- 
Table 2 (Study 1) presents the results for the effect of subordinate feedback on 
powerholders’ self-regulation across rounds, testing Hypothesis 2. Findings indicate that 
powerholders in groups of two compliant subordinates and one candid subordinate were 
responsive to subordinate feedback and regulated their allocation behavior over time, such that 
they took less (more) of the common resource after receiving more (less) negative feedback (β 
= .30, p < .001, see Table 2 [Study 1]). Specifically, the presence of a lone subordinate providing 
candid feedback was enough to cause the powerholder to adjust his or her allocations in the 
direction of the subordinate feedback, regulating their allocations over time. This effect consistent 
with that found by Oc et al. (2015), except in their case self-regulation was observed in groups of 
all candid subordinates, where here just one candid subordinate in a group of otherwise compliant 
subordinates was enough to elicit powerholders’ self-regulatory tendencies.  
To ensure that it was the lone dissenter’s feedback that drove this self-regulatory effect, we 
performed a separate random effects panel data analysis with compliant feedback of the majority 
subordinates and candid feedback of the lone subordinate at previous round as the two 
independent variables and the change in powerholders’ allocation decision at the current round as 
the dependent variable. In other words, we decomposed the differential effects of the lone candid 
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subordinate from the pair of compliant subordinates on powerholders’ self-regulation. While the 
coefficient for the compliant feedback of the majority subordinates was non-significant (β = .02, p 
= .66), the coefficient for the lone dissenting subordinate’s candid feedback was positive and 
significant (β = .31, p < .001), providing evidence that the lone subordinate’s candid feedback is 
driving powerholders’ self-regulation their allocation behavior over time (see Table 3 [Study 1]). 
These results provide support for both Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
--------------- Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here --------------- 
Study 2 
Study 1 provided initial evidence for the effect of lone dissenting subordinates on 
powerholders’ allocation behavior. In Study 2, we extend the findings of Study 1 by focusing on 
the moderating role of group identification, and examine whether the feedback of lone dissenting 
subordinates who share a salient group membership with the powerholder is more influential 
than the feedback of those who do not (Hypothesis 3).  
Sample 
 One hundred and forty-five MBA students at a major business school in the U.K. 
participated in this study as part of a class exercise (37% female). The average age of 
participants was 28.80 years (SD = 2.42, Min = 24, Max = 39). Participants had held an average 
of 3.22 full-time (SD = 1.23) and 3.20 part-time jobs (SD = 1.81) in a number of industries, 
including but not limited to consulting (29%), finance (28%), energy (7%), and the public sector 
(6%). Participation was voluntary, and participants earned a 2% bonus on their final grade.  
Experimental Setting and Procedure 
 The experimental setting and procedure was similar to Study 1, with four exceptions. 
First, we contacted participants by email inviting them to take part in an online simulation and 
included a link to the study that was programmed in Qualtrics. Second, due to time constraints, 
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we limited this study to five allocation rounds (instead of ten, as in Study 1). Third, instead of a 
financial allocation, students allocated a proportion of the 2% bonus they could earn for 
participating. This represented a more meaningful reward to this population. However, everyone 
who participated was awarded the 2% bonus at the end of the session, regardless of how they 
made their allocations. Fourth, in order to explore whether the influence of lone dissenting 
subordinates is stronger when they share a salient group membership with the powerholder, we 
varied the subordinates’ university affiliations. Specifically, we told our participants (students 
from a London-based business school, henceforth referred to as “London”) that they would be 
participating in a simulation with a group of four participants, either from their home school 
(“London”) or another major business school in Europe (henceforth referred to as “Europe”).  
To ensure that their identity as a student at “London” was a meaningful one on which to 
base a manipulation of group identification, we measured the extent to which participants 
identified with the university, using Smith et al.’s (2007) 4-item measure of group identification 
(α = .83), on a 7-point scale (higher values refer to stronger identification). Three students 
reported extremely low levels of identification with “London” (lower than 3). Consistent with 
previous research on group identification (Cohen, 2003; Smith et al., 2007), we excluded these 
students from the analysis, to ensure that our sample consisted only of students who strongly 
identified with their school (i.e., those for whom “London” was a meaningful group identity).2 
As in Study 1, we included questions to check participants’ understanding of the rules of 
the experimental game and their role within it. Four participants failed to answer the questions 
correctly. We also included three attention check items in the study, which seven participants 
failed. Finally, at the end of the study, three participants reported that they had misunderstood the 
manipulation. Thus, we report results for the 128 participants who had paid attention, identified 
with their school and understood the task correctly. 
                                                     
2 We also re-analyzed our data including these participants. The results were unchanged. 
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Conditions  
 There were four conditions in the study. In the high identification candid condition, 
powerholders (who were all “London” students) had one candid “London” subordinate and two 
compliant “London” subordinates; while, in the low identification candid condition, 
powerholders had one candid “Europe” subordinate and two compliant “London” subordinates. 
In contrast, in the high identification compliant condition, the group included one compliant 
“London” subordinate and two candid “London” subordinates; while, in the low identification 
compliant condition the group included one compliant “Europe” subordinate and two candid 
“London” subordinates. The school affiliations of each group member (“London” or “Europe”) 
were shown to participants before and during the simulation. Hence, in each round, powerholders 
were aware of the school affiliations of the subordinates who were providing them either candid 
or compliant feedback. 
Measures and Operationalization 
Classification of powerholders’ allocation behavior. We classified powerholders’ 
allocation behavior the same way as in Study 1.  
Subordinate feedback. Reactions of both candid and compliant subordinates were 
modeled in the same way as in Study 1, irrespective of their group membership. As in Study 1, 
powerholders observed both individual ratings of their subordinates along with the average rating 
and standard deviation of the three subordinates’ ratings.  
Identification. As a manipulation check, we measured the extent to which participants 
identified with each of three subordinates using three items of Hafer’s (2000) identification 
measure (α = .97), on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (to a very great extent) (e.g., 
“Overall, how much do you identify yourself with Subordinate 3?”).  
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Results 
Manipulation Check. A two-tailed t-test confirmed that participants (i.e., “London” 
students) in the lone compliant conditions identified more with the lone compliant subordinate 
when that subordinate was a “London” student than a “Europe” student (MLondon = 4.33, SDLondon 
= 1.27 vs. MEurope = 3.60, SDEurope = 1.32, t(63) = -2.27, p = .03) while the differences in 
participants’ identification with the majority candid subordinates (all of whom were “London” 
students) in both conditions were not statistically significant (ps > .50). Similarly, participants in 
the lone candid conditions identified more with the lone candid subordinate when the 
subordinate was a “London” student than a “Europe” student (MLondon = 3.65, SDLondon = 1.32 vs. 
MEurope = 2.90, SDEurope = 1.14, t(61) = -2.42, p = .02) while there were no statistically significant 
differences in the extent to which participants identified with the majority compliant 
subordinates (all of whom were “London” students) in both conditions (ps > .30). These results 
indicate that our manipulation of (group) identification was successful.  
Hypothesis Tests. Similar to how we tested Hypotheses 1 and 2 in Study 1, we tested 
Hypothesis 3 using the xtreg.re command in STATA. Hypothesis 3 predicted that the upward 
trend in powerholders’ self-allocations will be more positive (i.e., steeper) in the presence of a 
lone compliant subordinate who shares a salient group membership with the powerholder (i.e., a 
“London” lone subordinate) compared to when the lone compliant subordinate does not (i.e., a 
“Europe” lone subordinate) (Hypothesis 3a) and that powerholders would regulate their 
allocation behavior (i.e., adjust their next round’s allocation in the direction of the lone 
subordinate’s feedback) to a greater extent when they shared a salient group membership with 
the subordinate (i.e., a “London” lone subordinate) compared when they did not (i.e., a “Europe” 
lone subordinate) (Hypothesis 3b).  
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To compare regression coefficients from the high identification (“London”) and low 
identification (“Europe”) regression equations within the lone candid and the lone compliant 
subordinate models, we used a formula developed by Cohen (1983) and used in previous 
research (Judge, Rodell, Klinger, Simon, & Crawford, 2013) which results in a z-value that tests 
whether the regression coefficients across the models are significantly different. Providing 
support for Hypothesis 3a, the regression coefficient representing the upward trend in 
powerholders’ self-allocations over time was significantly more positive (i.e., the upward trend 
was stronger) for powerholders with compliant “London” lone subordinates (β = .09, p = .04) 
than it was for powerholders with a compliant “Europe” lone subordinate (β = -.05, p = .22, z = 
2.34, p = .01) (see Table 1 [Study 2]). Providing support for Hypothesis 3b, powerholders with a 
candid “London” lone subordinate (β = .28, p < .001) regulated their behavior more strongly than 
powerholders with a candid “Europe” lone subordinate (β = .05, p = .60, z = 2.00, p = .02) (see 
Figure 3 and Table 2 [Study 2]).  
Finally, we again tested whose feedback drove the changes in powerholders’ allocations. 
A second panel data regression with the lone subordinate’s candid feedback and the majority 
subordinates’ compliant feedback as separate independent variables revealed a positive and 
significant coefficient for the candid feedback (β = .18, p = .02) but a non-significant coefficient 
for the compliant feedback (β = .02, p = .81) (see Table 3 [Study 2]). 
Study 3 
Studies 1 and 2 show that a lone dissenting subordinate can influence how powerholders 
allocate resources over time (Hypotheses 1 and 2) and Study 2 shows that their influence 
becomes stronger when the lone dissenting subordinate and the powerholder share a salient 
group membership (Hypothesis 3). In Study 3, we replicate our findings for Hypothesis 3 using a 
different social group to manipulate identification and further examine whether powerholders 
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individually reward or penalize the lone dissenting subordinate as a function of the feedback they 
provide (Hypotheses 4 and 5) and the extent to which the powerholder and subordinate share a 
salient group membership (Hypothesis 6).  
Sample 
 We recruited one hundred and sixty-five U.S. residents through Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk. Participants earned $1.50 for their participation and up to an additional $1.00 depending on 
the allocation decisions they made. Participants were full-time working adults (48% female). The 
average age of the participants was 33.22 years (SD = 11.01, Min = 18, Max = 74), and their 
average tenure in their current position and in their current organization was 3.25 years (SD = 
3.19) and 4.53 years (SD = 4.54) respectively. Our participants occupied different hierarchical 
levels in their organizations: upper-management (n = 10), middle-management (n = 34), first-line 
supervisors (n = 39), and non-management (n = 82).  
Experimental Setting and Procedure 
The experimental setting and procedure of this online study was same as Study 2, with two 
exceptions. First, we manipulated subordinates’ identification with the powerholder using 
participants’ political party affiliation rather than their university affiliation. At the beginning of 
the experiment, participants indicated whether they identified more as a Democrat or Republican 
(1: I identify as a Democrat, 2: I identify as a Republican, 3: I feel no meaningful ties to either 
party). Six participants who reported no meaningful ties to either party were not allowed to 
continue in the study. Second, we included an 11th allocation round, in which powerholders 
allocated resources to subordinates individually rather than as a group. This gave us the 
opportunity to see whether powerholders used their power to punish or reward specific 
subordinates after having received their individual feedback for the prior 10 rounds. We also 
returned to a financial allocation, in this case up to $1.00 in additional financial compensation. 
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As in Studies 1 and 2, participants were given detailed information about the study’s design 
and procedure and responded to questions to check their understanding of the rules and their roles 
in the study. Participants who failed any of these questions were allowed to re-read the rules once 
and respond to the questions again, but failing any of these questions a second time disallowed 
participants from continuing. We also included three attention check items throughout the study. 
Six participants failed at least one of these attention checks and were also excluded from the 
analyses. In addition, out of the remaining 153 participants, only 36 indicated identifying as a 
Republican. Previous research has shown that MTurk samples tend to be more Democratic than 
national samples obtained by the American National Election Studies (ANES), Cooperative 
Congressional Election Survey (CCES), and Current Population Survey (CPS) (Berinsky, Huber, 
& Lenz, 2012; Huff & Tingley, 2015). As we did not have enough power to analyze the 
Republicans in the sample, we restricted our analyses to individuals who identified as Democrats. 
Thus, in this study, our participants identify strongly with Democrats, and do not identify with 
Republicans (Cohen, 2003; Smith et al., 2007). Our final sample included the 117 participants 
who both passed the attention checks and identified as Democrats. 
Conditions  
 As in Study 2, we randomly assigned participants to one of four conditions: two lone 
candid conditions and two lone compliant conditions, that varied as a function of whether the 
lone subordinate shared group membership with the powerholder (i.e., high 
identification/Democrat) or did not (i.e., low identification/Republican). In the high 
identification/lone candid condition, the group included one candid Democrat and two compliant 
Democrats. In the low identification/lone candid condition, the group included one candid 
Republican and two compliant Democrats. In contrast, in the high identification/lone compliant 
condition, the group included one compliant Democrat and two candid Democrats, and in the low 
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identification/lone compliant condition the group included one compliant Republican and two 
candid Democrats. As in Study 2, the identities of each group member (Democrat or Republican) 
were shown to participants before and during the simulation. Hence, in each round, powerholders 
were aware of the party affiliations of the subordinates who were providing them either candid or 
compliant feedback. 
Measures and Operationalization 
  Classification of powerholders’ allocation behavior. We classified powerholders’ 
allocation behavior the same way as in Studies 1 and 2.  
Subordinate feedback. The feedback of the majority and lone subordinates was 
computed the same way as in Study 1 and 2. As in Studies 1 and 2, we provided powerholders 
with individual feedback from each of their subordinates after each round, as well as the average 
and standard deviation of the group.  
Identification. We used the same three items from Hafer’s (2000) identification measure 
(α = .97) as in Study 2.  
Results 
Manipulation Check. As in Study 2, in order to examine whether our manipulation of 
group identification was successful, we conducted a two-tailed t-test that confirmed that 
participants (i.e., Democrat powerholders) in the lone compliant subordinate conditions 
identified more strongly with the compliant Democrat than the compliant Republican (MDemocrat = 
4.48, SDDemocrat = 1.37 vs. MRepublican = 3.38, SDRepublican = 1.23, t(58) = -3.30, p < .001) while in 
both conditions the differences in the extent to which participants identified with the majority 
candid subordinates (all Democrats) were not statistically significant (ps > .60). Similarly, 
participants in the lone candid conditions identified more strongly with the candid Democrat than 
the candid Republican (MDemocrat = 3.49, SDDemocrat = 1.59 vs. MRepublican = 1.92, SDRepublican = .89, 
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t(55) = -4.60, p < .001) while in both conditions there were no statistically significant differences 
in the extent to which participants identified with majority compliant subordinates (all 
Democrats) (ps > .60).  
Hypothesis Tests. Recall that Hypothesis 3 predicted that the influence of the lone 
dissenting subordinate will be stronger when the powerholder and the lone subordinate share a 
salient group membership. As in Study 2, we used Cohen’s (1983) formula to compare 
regression coefficients across models. A comparison of the regression coefficients in Table 1 
(Study 3) revealed that the upward trend in powerholders’ self-allocations was significantly 
stronger in the lone compliant Democrat condition (β = .24, p < .001), than in the lone compliant 
Republican condition (β = .10, p < .001, z = 2.56, p = .01). In addition, a comparison of the 
regression coefficients in Table 2 (Study 3) revealed that powerholders with a lone candid 
Democrat (β = .20, p < .001) responded significantly more strongly to subordinate feedback than 
powerholders with a lone candid Republican (β = .07, p = .26, z = 2.29, p = .01), providing 
additional support for Hypotheses 3a and 3b.  
Again, to confirm that the changes in powerholders’ allocations were driven by the lone 
candid subordinate’s feedback, we ran a random panel data regression with the lone 
subordinate’s candid feedback and the majority subordinates’ compliant feedback as separate 
independent variables. It revealed a positive and significant coefficient for the candid feedback 
(β = .11, p = .03) but a non-significant coefficient for the compliant feedback (β = .06, p = .27) 
(see Table 3 [Study 3]). 
Hypotheses 4, 5 and 6 focus on the individual consequences lone dissenting subordinates 
face as a function of their feedback, and whether the extent to which the powerholder shares a 
salient group membership with the dissenter moderates this relationship. Specifically, we 
examine whether a lone compliant subordinate is individually rewarded (Hypothesis 4) and 
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whether those rewards are amplified when the powerholder and subordinate share a salient group 
membership (Hypothesis 6a). Additionally, we test whether or not a lone candid subordinate is 
individually penalized (Hypothesis 5, Option A or Option B) and whether those penalties are 
attenuated when they share a salient group membership with the powerholder (Hypothesis 6b).  
Since there is only one observation for individual resource allocations per participant, we 
tested these hypotheses using a mixed ANOVA, with two between-subjects factors (whether the 
lone dissenting subordinate was compliant vs. candid and whether the lone dissenting 
subordinate was Republican vs. Democrat), and the recipient (the lone dissenting subordinate vs. 
the majority) as a within-subjects factor. Results confirmed a main effect for recipient, F(1, 113) 
= 4.33, p = .04, η2p = .04, meaning that powerholders did not allocate resources equally across 
their subordinates in the 11th round. This main effect for recipient was qualified by a significant 
interaction with the type of feedback the lone dissenting subordinate had provided (compliant vs. 
candid), F(1, 113) = 15.56, p < .001, η2p= .12, as well as a significant interaction with the 
subordinate’s political affiliation, F(1, 113) = 9.04, p = .003, η2p = .07, indicating that 
powerholders allocated different amounts to lone and majority subordinates as a function of their 
group’s composition (whether the lone subordinate was candid vs. compliant as well as whether 
he or she was a Republican or a Democrat) (see Figure 3). 
--------------- Insert Figure 3 about here --------------- 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that lone compliant subordinates would be awarded more of the 
common resource than the candid subordinates of their group. Lone compliant subordinates in 
groups of candid subordinates were allocated 8 more experimental points, on average, than their 
candid peers (MLone Compliant = 21.16, SD = 14.76 vs. MCandid Majority= 12.99, SD = 10.39, F(1, 113) 
= 18.63, p < .001, η2p = .14). Thus, Hypothesis 4 is supported. In contrast, lone candid 
subordinates in groups of compliant subordinates were not allocated significantly fewer 
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experimental points, on average, than their compliant peers (MLone Candid = 15.40, SD = 17.24 vs. 
MCompliant Majority= 17.89, SD = 15.48, F(1, 113) = 1.69, p = .19, η2p = .02). While we acknowledge 
the difficulty and danger in drawing conclusions from a null effect, this finding suggests that 
individuals can provide accurate feedback to those with power over them without being overtly 
penalized for doing so (providing support for Option B of Hypothesis 5 rather than Option A). 
Hypothesis 6 predicted that (6a) the amount that a lone compliant subordinate would be 
awarded and that (6b) the penalty a lone candid subordinate would suffer would be moderated by 
the extent to which the powerholder identified with the lone dissenting subordinate. Supporting 
Hypothesis 6a, powerholders only allocated significantly more of the common resource to lone 
compliant subordinates when they shared a political affiliation: a lone compliant Democrat was 
awarded more than his candid Democratic counterparts (MLone Compliant Democrat = 23.93, SD = 
16.51 vs. MCandid Majority Democrats = 11.62, SD = 10.37, F(1, 113) = 19.82, p < .001), but a lone 
compliant Republican received no statistically significant benefit for his compliance (MLone 
Compliant Republican = 18.56, SD = 12.63 vs. MCandid Majority Democrats = 14.27, SD = 10.40, F(1, 113) = 
2.57, p = .11), compared to his candid Democratic counterparts.  
Supporting Hypothesis 6b, powerholders only allocated significantly less of the common 
resource to lone candid subordinates when they did not share a political affiliation: a lone candid 
Democrat was not significantly penalized for his candor, compared to his compliant Democratic 
counterparts (MLone Candid Democrat = 19.76, SD = 14.40 vs. MCompliant Majority Democrats = 18.05, SD = 
10.32, F(1, 113) = .38, p = .54), though a lone candid Republican was significantly penalized for 
his (MLone Candid Republican = 10.89, SD = 18.97 vs. MCompliant Majority Democrats = 17.73, SD = 19.66, F(1, 
113) = 5.90, p = .02). These results add nuance to the basic test of Hypothesis 5, and suggest that 
powerholders’ rewards or penalties for their subordinates’ compliance or candor vary as a 
function of their identification with those subordinates. 
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General Discussion 
Dominant portrayals of the powerholder/subordinate relationship as well as the theorizing 
about this relationship often take the view that influence flows unidirectionally from 
powerholders to subordinates, and that subordinates merely accept the outcomes they are 
allocated (Handgraaf et al., 2003; Nemeth, 2009). However, recent research challenges this 
approach and assigns a more agentic role to subordinates, showing that they can, in fact, 
influence how powerholders make the tradeoff between their own self-interest and the interest of 
their subordinates as they allocate resources (Oc et al., 2015). Nevertheless, in these literatures to 
date, subordinates have been treated as an undifferentiated mass, despite the fact that 
subordinates often vary widely in their characteristics and likely have different reactions to 
powerholders’ decisions (Weber & Moore, 2014).  
In this paper, we focused on one important type of unique subordinate: those who are 
willing to express a singular view within the group, when all the others express a different view. 
We explored whether these lone dissenting subordinates influenced how powerholders allocated 
their resources. In Study 1, we tested the influence of lone subordinates when they provided 
powerholders with candid or compliant feedback that differed from the feedback provided by 
other group members. We demonstrated that one compliant subordinate in a group of candid 
subordinates was enough to make powerholders allocate resources in an increasingly self-
interested manner over time, and that one candid subordinate in a group of compliant 
subordinates was enough to make powerholders regulate their allocation behavior in line with the 
feedback they received from the lone subordinate. Our results in Studies 2 and 3 advanced these 
findings by exploring the moderating role that group identification has in this relationship. We 
showed that the influence of a lone dissenting subordinate increases when he or she shares a 
salient group membership with the powerholder.  
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Finally, we examined the consequences lone dissenting subordinates face as a function of 
the feedback they provide and whether they share a salient group membership with the 
powerholder. We showed that while powerholders do reward lone compliant subordinates in 
groups of candid subordinates, on average, lone candid subordinates in groups of complaint 
subordinates were not penalized by powerholders. However, the individual outcomes that lone 
compliant and candid subordinates received depended on powerholders’ identification with the 
lone subordinate. Specifically, lone compliant subordinates were rewarded with more resources 
by the powerholder, even more so when they shared group membership with the powerholder. In 
contrast, lone candid subordinates were only penalized and given fewer resources than the other 
compliant group members when they did not share group membership with the powerholder. 
Theoretical Contributions 
Our research is relevant to a number of domains. First of all, this research extends our 
understanding of how to contain the (often) self-interested inclinations of powerholders (Kipnis, 
1972) and represents a rare effort to consider whether differences among subordinates matter in 
their influence over powerholders. In this regard, this work speaks to previous research on 
power, especially to research on whether subordinates can influence powerholders’ decisions or 
behaviors (e.g., Handgraaf et al., 2003), and if so, what factors might make some subordinates 
more influential than others (Oc & Bashshur, 2013; Oc et al., 2015). Importantly, we are able to 
show that dissenting subordinates influence how powerholders allocate resources, even when 
these subordinates are a lone voice, and thus take on individual risk (Asch, 1951).   
This work also contributes to the existing literature on social and minority influence. The 
majority of research in this area examines whether the verbal and behavioral reactions of 
numeric minority in a group influence the opinions, beliefs, decisions, behaviors or reactions of 
group majorities (David & Turner, 2001; Moscovici & Lage, 1976; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1974). 
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As useful as this literature is, it tends to focus on groups without power differentials among their 
members. It does not make specific predictions about whether lone subordinates can have an 
effect on those who hold power over them, or how the existence of power differentials among 
group members (which most groups have) might affect outcomes. This paper helps advance our 
knowledge on minority influence by considering power differentials embedded in group 
relations, and tests specific predictions about whether lone subordinates can elicit adjustments in 
powerholders’ resource allocations. Our findings suggest that lone dissenting subordinates can be 
an important source of influence, even over those who are more powerful than they are. 
Furthermore, most research on minority influence does not answer questions about the 
consequences minorities or dissenters face after their attempts to influence others. Our work 
integrates research on upward feedback (Ashford & Cummings, 1983; Atwater et al., 2000; 
Atwater & Waldman, 2008; Taylor et al., 1984; Waldman & Atwater, 2001) with work on 
minority influence (Phillips & Loyd, 2003; Turner, 1985; Wood et al., 1994) to argue that 
powerholders reward lone dissenting subordinates who provide them with constant positive 
feedback and reward them even more when they share group membership. More importantly, we 
theorize and show that powerholders only penalize lone dissenting subordinates who provide 
them with candid feedback when they do not share a salient group membership.  
Finally, this research has implications for information flow within organizations. Indeed, 
competitive business environments require organizations to be more creative and innovative 
(Tushman & O’Reilly, 1997). While lower level employees can offer creative ideas for 
innovation (Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996; Axtell et al., 2000), it is 
powerholders who evaluate and decide whether or not to implement those ideas (Zhou & 
Shalley, 2003). A growing body of research focuses on the factors that influence how receptive 
powerholders are to subordinates’ creative ideas (Detert & Burris, 2007; Sijbom, Janssen, & 
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Yperen, 2015a, 2015b). Our findings suggest that powerholders may be most open to the ideas of 
subordinates with whom they strongly identify, even when they express dissenting opinions.   
Practical Implications  
Our research also has several important practical implications. Our findings suggest that 
lone dissenting subordinates who advocate for greater equality in how resources are allocated in 
groups will succeed: their voice makes powerholders adjust their allocations in line with their 
feedback. More importantly, lone dissenting subordinates who are candid about how unfair 
powerholders’ allocations are do not appear to be penalized for expressing those views, as long 
as they share a salient group membership with the powerholder. In contrast, however, lone 
subordinates who may want to enjoy preferential treatment, and care less about what other 
subordinates receive, could support powerholder’s allocations irrespective of how self-interested 
they are and will likely be rewarded for doing so.  
Given these findings suggest that powerholders may be more susceptible to the influence 
of lone dissenting subordinates than previously understood and are more influenced by 
subordinates who share a salient group membership with them, formal feedback mechanisms that 
prevent powerholders from identifying which subordinates are providing the feedback they 
receive may be particularly important (Antonioni, 1994). Even with such systems in place, our 
findings suggest that powerholders should be made aware of the influence subordinate feedback 
has and the need to be responsive to it. Subordinate feedback can have a positive impact on 
powerholders’ performance (Seifert & Yukl, 2010) and upward feedback is most powerful for 
receivers who discuss their ratings with their subordinates (Walker & Smither, 1999) or with an 
executive coach (Luthans & Peterson, 2003). Hence, involving neutral third parties (e.g., 
facilitators, ombudspeople) to handle the process of voice, and, if necessary, manage disputes 
that arise between subordinates and powerholders as a consequence (Harlos, 2001), might help 
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mitigate powerholders’ tendencies to turn a deaf ear to their subordinates’ reactions (Eaton & 
Keefe, 1999; Harlos, 2001).  
A less expensive solution might include training for organizational powerholders to 
ensure they have the necessary skills and abilities to identify and respond appropriately to 
different types of subordinate feedback. Training focused on an individual’s awareness as well as 
their abilities and skills, and employing different teaching techniques (group activities, reflection 
exercises, role plays, or group discussions) can improve powerholders’ affect, cognition, and 
behavior when responding to subordinate feedback (Kulik & Roberson, 2008). In doing so, 
however, organizations should perform a needs analysis to accurately identify the goals they 
want to achieve and ensure the program has support from upper management, recognizing the 
program as part of its strategic goals (King, Gulick, & Avery, 2010).   
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions  
The present research has several noteworthy strengths. First, in each of the three 
experimental studies, powerholders had no interaction with subordinates before the study and did 
not know who they were. Furthermore, powerholders were told that subordinate feedback would 
not impact powerholders’ earnings, and thus they were not obliged to consider how satisfied 
subordinates were with their allocations. Despite this complete independence and anonymity, our 
participants still adjusted how they allocated resources as a function of the feedback they 
received from subordinates, even though those subordinates were voicing lone dissenting 
opinions. We also replicated our findings with different samples, participating for different 
stakes, and with different manipulations of group identification.  
As with any study, ours is not without limitations. First, our participants were only 
involved in a short-term relationship with their subordinates, with no prospect for continued 
interaction. This is not the typical arrangement in a real organization. However, we would 
predict that when powerholders and subordinates have an ongoing relationship, the stakes for not 
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acting upon the view expressed by a lone subordinate might be even higher. When subordinate 
feedback is heard but ignored, it can lead to negative outcomes such as lower subordinate 
performance, voluntary turnover, or withdrawal (Bashshur & Oc, 2015). This makes the potential 
implications of subordinate feedback more important for powerholders in ongoing situations and 
the influence of lone subordinates potentially more powerful than demonstrated in our studies. 
Second, we examined the influence of lone subordinates in groups of three. It is unclear 
whether they would retain this influence in larger groups. Their influence might change 
depending on how much of a minority they represent (i.e., a lone voice in a group of three 
compared to a lone voice in a group of five, or ten). While social impact theory proposes that the 
potential influence of each individual decreases as group size increases (Latané & Wolf, 1981), 
research on minority influence suggests that lone dissenting subordinates may actually gain 
strength as the group size increases, because they become even more distinct in larger groups 
(Nemeth, Wachtler, & Endicott, 1977). These conflicting perspectives make future research on 
how lone subordinates influence changes as a function of group size more critical. 
Third, we examined the effect of subordinate feedback in a context where powerholders’ 
decisions were visible to their subordinates. However, the social influence literature underscores 
the importance of studying private judgments (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Publicly, our 
powerholders tended to move in the direction of the lone dissenting subordinate’s feedback. 
However, we were unable to test whether these were sincere changes, or simply public 
compliance without private acceptance. This is an important area for future exploration, as public 
compliance without private acceptance is associated with superficial cognitive processing and 
only a temporary change in behavior. In contrast, public compliance with private acceptance can 
result in extensive cognitive processing and lasting attitude change (Wood, 2000).  
Fourth, the social influence literature suggests that powerholders may be dependent on 
their subordinates for a number of reasons, including information that helps them make sense of 
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the environment, or simply to satisfy basic needs (Latané & Wolf, 1981; Oc & Bashshur, 2013). 
For instance, Oc and Bashshur (2013) argue that powerholders who are dependent on their 
subordinates for affiliation needs are more likely to be influenced by socially close subordinates, 
because what these subordinates think of their actions carries more weight. Future research could 
explore these needs and examine their interaction with identification to shed more light on the 
upward influence processes between subordinates and powerholders.  
In a similar vein, recent research on power describes two distinct motivational strategies 
individuals use when they pursue or maintain a position of power: dominance and prestige. 
Powerholders motivated by dominance achieve or maintain power through force, coercion, or 
manipulation of group resources, while powerholders motivated by prestige do so by gaining 
subordinates’ respect or by helping their group attain its goals (Maner & Mead, 2010; Mead & 
Maner, 2012). Powerholders with higher levels of dominance motivation might be not only less 
affected by what their subordinates think of their actions, but also more likely to force lone candid 
subordinates to fall in line. In contrast, lone candid subordinates may have more influence over 
leaders motivated by prestige, because these leaders will be more sensitive to decisions that will 
earn their subordinates’ respect. In many ways, dominance and prestige motivation likely function 
analogously to power and status differentially affect how powerholders treat others (Blader & 
Chen, 2012). Examining such motives would be another area of “low hanging fruit” for future 
research. 
Fifth, our study design and data do not allow us to test one more interesting question. One 
could still argue that group identification should play a less important role when the lone 
dissenting subordinate is compliant rather than candid. Indeed, our findings in Study 2 and Study 
3 somewhat confirm this. In both studies, the coefficient values for lone candid subordinates are 
only significant in the high identification conditions and non-significant in the low identification 
conditions. In contrast, the coefficient values in lone compliant conditions are all significant, 
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except in the low identification condition in Study 3 (p = .26). This suggests that the effect of 
group identification may indeed be stronger for the lone candid subordinate. Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that group identification should not matter when the lone subordinate is compliant. 
It still should. In groups where the majority of subordinates provide powerholders with 
challenging and negative feedback, the relatively more positive feedback they receive from the 
lone compliant subordinate should alleviate potentially self-threatening aspects of subordinate 
feedback. In fact, such compliant feedback should be more influential when it comes from 
someone who shares the group membership with the powerholder. In other words, it will be easier 
for powerholders to act in line with the positive feedback they receive from someone who belongs 
to the same group (than someone who belongs to another group) while others provide them 
negative feedback. As we used different analyses to understand the effect of the lone candid and 
lone compliant feedback, we are not able to go further in empirically testing these arguments with 
our data. We hope that future research will continue to apply theoretical arguments rooted in 
group identification to explain these complex relationships more precisely.  
Sixth, this research examined the influence of lone compliant and candid subordinates on 
powerholders’ allocation decisions exclusively in settings where every subordinate spoke up and 
communicated their fairness perceptions. Our effects might differ in settings where some 
subordinates choose to remain silent. Conceptually, speaking up is more than the opposite of 
silence, and the underlying processes, motives and consequences of voice and silence vary 
(Morrison, 2014; Van Dyne, Ang, & Botero, 2003). For instance, while voice is often a response 
to dissatisfaction, silence is often a response to fear (Morrison, 2014). Similarly, while employee 
silence is actually a fear of dissent, it is frequently misidentified as consent, which in turn can 
result in misunderstandings and unexpected and incongruent consequences for those who choose 
to remain silent (Van Dyne et al., 2003). Thus, future research would be well-served to explore 
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how the effects of candid and compliant subordinates are different in groups where some 
subordinates remain silent rather than express an opinion. 
Finally, the absence of a mediating variable to help further unpack the process is a 
limitation. We argued that the effect of both compliant and candid feedback was mediated by 
changes in the powerholders’ desired self-image or identity such that compliant feedback boosts 
their image and candid feedback threatens that image. Future research could draw from the 
earlier work on threats to intra-group position or status (e.g., Mead & Maner, 2012; Okimoto & 
Wenzel, 2011) to further theorize around and test the extent to which powerholders perceive the 
feedback of lone dissenting subordinates as threatening to their public or private self-image. 
Overall, we believe our findings provide compelling evidence that subordinates function 
as an important source of influence over powerholders, even when they hold a lone dissenting 
position. Our evidence that a lone candid subordinate can influence how powerholders allocate 
resources is especially encouraging. In our studies, their singular voice prevented powerholders 
from sliding towards even more self-interested allocations over time. Moreover, as long as they 
shared a salient group membership with the powerholder, they were not penalized for doing so. 
Encouraging candid lone subordinates to speak up, especially those who share salient group 
identities with those who hold power over them, can help curb powerholders’ self-interested 
tendencies, even in groups where everyone else unquestionably supports powerholders’ actions. 
If more lone subordinates did put their head above the parapet and speak up when those with 
power over them behave unfairly, it would be a better world for many.  
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Appendix: Data transparency 
The data in this manuscript have not been published elsewhere. However, the data we 
collected for Study 1 in this manuscript originally included other conditions, and findings from 
that data collection were reported in a separate published manuscript. Both the published and 
current manuscript focus on powerholders’ allocation behavior and subordinate feedback. Our 
action editor for the previous published manuscript asked us to drop the conditions included in 
the current manuscript to better streamline the contribution of that publication and we agreed 
with him/her. As we argue in the current manuscript, however, the effects of and on lone voices 
are important, and therefore we report results from the two conditions we were asked to drop 
from the now-published other manuscript as Study 1 in the current manuscript.   
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Table 1 
Panel Data Regressions on the Effect of Subordinate Feedback on Powerholders’ Self-Allocations over Time 
 
 Trend of the average amount of resources powerholders allocate to themselves, across the rounds of the experiment 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
 
Lone Compliant 
(N = 35;  
350 observ.) 
Lone Compliant 
“London” 
[high identification] 
(N = 33; 139 observ.) 
Lone Compliant 
“Europe” 
[low identification] 
(N = 32; 160 observ.) 
Lone Compliant 
Democrat 
[high identification] 
(N = 29; 290 observ.) 
Lone Compliant 
Republican 
[low identification] 
(N = 31; 310 observ.) 
Time 1.06** 1.46* -.87 2.75** 1.22** 
   SE .30 .70 .71 .46 .38 
   β .10** .09* -.05 .24** .10** 
      
R2 Overall  
0.0101 
0.0382 
0.007 
0.033 
0.002 
0.012 
0.058 
0.121 
0.010 
0.036 
Wald chi2 12.32 4.43 1.50 35.89 10.27 
 
Note. “Time” refers to unstandardized coefficients for the rounds in the experimental game. SE refers to standard errors and β refers to the 
standardized coefficients. observ. = observations. 1Upper R2 values were calculated in the manner proposed by Snijders and Bosker (1994). 
2Lower R2 values were calculated in the manner proposed by Raudenbush and Bryk, 1986 and Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992. * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 2  
 
Panel Data Regressions of the Effect of Subordinate Feedback on Round-by-Round Changes in Powerholders’ Self-Allocations 
 
 
Effect of prior round’s feedback on the change in powerholders’ allocation in the following round 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
 
Lone Candid 
(N = 35;  
315 observ.) 
Lone Candid “London”  
[high identification] 
(N = 33; 132 observ.) 
Lone Candid 
“Europe” 
[low identification] 
(N = 30; 120 observ.) 
Lone Candid 
Democrat  
[high identification] 
(N = 29; 261 observ.) 
Lone Candid 
Republican 
[low identification] 
(N = 28; 252 observ.) 
Feedback(t-1) 9.86** 9.02** 1.43 7.68** 1.55 
   SE 1.74 2.68 2.70 2.29 1.39 
   β .30** .28** .05 .20** .07 
      
R2 Overall 0.0931 0.080 0.002 0.042 0.005 
Wald chi2 32.08 11.36 0.28 11.28 1.25 
 
Note. “Feedback(t-1)” refers to the unstandardized coefficients for the feedback given by subordinates in the previous round. SE refers to 
standard errors and β refers to the standardized coefficients. observ. = observations. 1R2 values were the same in this study, regardless of whether 
they were calculated in the manner proposed by Snijders and Bosker (1994), or in the manner proposed by Raudenbush and Bryk, 1986 and 
Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992. * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 3 
 
Panel Data Regressions of the Effect of Majority Compliant and Lone Candid Subordinate Feedback on Round-by-Round Changes in 
Powerholders’ Self-Allocations 
 
 
Effect of prior round’s feedback on the change in powerholders’ allocation in the following round 
 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
 Lone Candid 
(N = 35; 315 observ.) 
Lone Candid 
(N = 63; 252 observ.) 
Lone Candid 
(N = 57; 513 observ.) 
 β SE β SE β SE 
Majority compliant feedback (t-1) .02 .05 .02 .07 .06 .05 
Lone candid feedback (t-1) .31* .05 .18* .07 .11* .05 
R2 Overall 0.0961  0.036  0.023  
Wald chi2 33.41  9.29  11.93  
 
Note. “Majority compliant feedback (t-1)” refers to the feedback given by the majority compliant subordinates in the previous round. “Lone 
candid feedback (t-1)” refers to the feedback given by the lone candid subordinates in the previous round. β refers to the standardized 
coefficients and SE refers to standard errors. observ. = observations. 1R2 values were the same in this study, regardless of whether they were 
calculated in the manner proposed by Snijders and Bosker (1994), or in the manner proposed by Raudenbush and Bryk, 1986 and Bryk and 
Raudenbush, 1992. * p < .05, ** p < .01
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Figure 1. Allocations powerholders gave to themselves in the lone candid feedback and lone 
compliant feedback conditions, Study 1 
 
Note. Total resources are measured in British cents; the total amount that could be allocated 
was £10.00.  
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Figure 2. Allocations powerholders gave to themselves in the lone candid feedback and lone 
compliant feedback conditions, Study 2 
 
Note. Total resources are measured as a proportion of the course participation bonus credits 
participants could allocate.   
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Figure 3. Powerholders’ resource allocations to individual subordinates in the 11th round, by condition, Study 3 
Note. Error bars indicate standard errors. 
0
10
20
30
2 candid D's 1 compliant
R
2 candid D's 1 compliant
D
2 compliant
D's
1 candid R 2 compliant
D's
1 candid D
C
a
n
d
id
D
e
m
o
c
ra
ts
C
o
m
p
li
a
n
t
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
a
n
C
a
n
d
id
D
e
m
o
c
ra
ts
C
o
m
p
li
a
n
t
D
e
m
o
c
ra
t
C
o
m
p
li
a
n
t
D
e
m
o
c
ra
ts
C
o
m
p
li
a
n
t
D
e
m
o
c
ra
ts
R
e
s
o
u
rc
e
A
llo
c
a
ti
o
n
s
 t
o
 I
n
d
iv
id
u
a
l 
S
u
b
o
rd
in
a
te
s
Lone Compliant 
Republican 
Lone Compliant
Democrat 
Condition
Lone Candid 
Republican 
Condition
Lone Candid 
Democrat 
C
a
n
d
id
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
a
n C
a
n
d
id
D
e
m
o
c
ra
t
Lone dissenting subordinate
Majority subordinates
